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Abstract
This paper considers point to point secure communication over flat fading channels under an outage constraint.
More specifically, we extend the definition of outage capacity to account for the secrecy constraint and obtain sharp
characterizations of the corresponding fundamental limits under two different assumptions on the transmitter CSI
(Channel state information). First, we find the outage secrecy capacity assuming that the transmitter has perfect
knowledge of the legitimate and eavesdropper channel gains. In this scenario, the capacity achieving scheme relies
on opportunistically exchanging private keys between the legitimate nodes. These keys are stored in a key buffer and
later used to secure delay sensitive data using the Vernam’s one time pad technique. We then extend our results to
the more practical scenario where the transmitter is assumed to know only the legitimate channel gain. Here, our
achievability arguments rely on privacy amplification techniques to generate secret key bits. In the two cases, we also
characterize the optimal power control policies which, interestingly, turn out to be a judicious combination of channel
inversion and the optimal ergodic strategy. Finally, we analyze the effect of key buffer overflow on the overall outage
probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication is a topic that is becoming increasingly important thanks to the proliferation of wireless
devices. Over the years, several secrecy protocols have been developed and incorporated in several wireless standards;
e.g., the IEEE 802.11 specifications for Wi-Fi. However, as new schemes are being developed, methods to counter
the specific techniques also appear. Breaking this cycle is critically dependent on the design of protocols that offer
provable secrecy guarantees. The information theoretic secrecy paradigm adopted here, allows for a systematic
approach for the design of low complexity and provable secrecy protocols that fully exploit the intrinsic properties
of the wireless medium.
Most of the recent work on information theoretic secrecy is, arguably, inspired by Wyner’s wiretap channel [2].
In this setup, a passive eavesdropper listens to the communication between two legitimate nodes over a separate
communication channel. While attempting to decipher the message, no limit is imposed on the computational
resources available to the eavesdropper. This assumption led to defining perfect secrecy capacity as the maximum
achievable rate subject to zero mutual information rate between the transmitted message and the signal received
by the eavesdropper. In the additive Gaussian noise scenario [3], the perfect secrecy capacity turned out to be
the difference between the capacities of the legitimate and eavesdropper channels. Therefore, if the eavesdropper
channel has a higher channel gain, information theoretic secure communication is not possible over the main
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1channel. Recent works have shown how to exploit multipath fading to avoid this limitation [4], [5], [7]. The basic
idea is to opportunistically exploit the instants when the main channel enjoys a higher gain than the eavesdropper
channel to exchange secure messages. This opportunistic secrecy approach was shown to achieve non-zero ergodic
secrecy capacity even when on average the eavesdropper channel has favorable conditions over the legitimate
channel. Remarkably, this result still holds even when the channel state information of the eavesdropper channel is
not available at the legitimate nodes.
The ergodic result in [4] applies only to delay tolerant traffic, e.g., file downloads. Early attempts at characterizing
the delay limited secrecy capacity drew the negative conclusion that non-zero delay limited secrecy rates are not
achievable, over almost all channel distributions, due to secrecy outage events corresponding to the instants when
the eavesdropper channel gain is larger than the main one [6], [8]. Later, it was shown in [14] that, interestingly,
a non-zero delay limited secrecy rate could be achieved by introducing private key queues at both the transmitter
and the receiver. These queues are used to store private key bits that are shared opportunistically between the
legitimate nodes when the main channel is more favorable than the one seen by the eavesdropper. These key bits
are used later to secure the delay sensitive data using the Vernam one time pad approach [1]. Hence, secrecy
outages are avoided by simply storing the secrecy generated previously, in the form of key bits, and using them
whenever the channel conditions are more advantageous for the eavesdropper. However, this work stopped short of
proving sharp capacity results or deriving the corresponding optimal power control policies. These results can be
recovered as special cases of the secrecy outage capacity and power control characterization obtained in the sequel.
In particular, this work investigates the outage secrecy capacity of point-to-point block fading channels. We first
consider the scenario where perfect knowledge about the main and eavesdropper channels are available a-priori at
the transmitter. The outage secrecy capacity and corresponding optimal power control policy is obtained and then
the results are generalized to the more practical scenario where only the main channel state information (CSI) is
available at the transmitter. Finally, the impact of the private key queue overflow on secrecy outage probability
is studied. Overall, our results reveals interesting structural insights on the optimal encoding and power control
schemes as well as sharp characterizations of the fundamental limits on secure communication of delay sensitive
traffic over fading channels.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.We formally introduce our system model in Section II. In Section III,
we obtain the capacity results for the full and main CSI scenarios. The optimal power control policies, for both
cases, are derived in Section IV. The effect of key buffer overflow on the outage probability is investigated in
Section V. We provide simulations to support our main results in Section VI. Finally, Section VII offers some
concluding remarks. To enhance the flow of the paper, the proofs are collected in the Appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We study a point-to-point wireless communication link, in which a transmitter is trying to send information to a
legitimate receiver, under the presence of a passive eavesdropper. We divide time into discrete slots, where blocks
are formed by N channel uses, and B blocks combine to form a super-block. Let the communication period consist
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2of S super-blocks. We use the notation (s, b) to denote the bth block in the sth super-block. We adopt a block fading
channel model, in which the channel is assumed to be constant over a block, and changes randomly from one block
to the next. Within each block (s, b), the observed signals at the receiver and at the eavesdropper are:
Y(s, b) = Gm(s, b)X(s, b) +Wm(s, b)
and
Z(s, b) = Ge(s, b)X(s, b) +We(s, b),
respectively, where X(s, b) ∈ CN is the transmitted signal, Y(s, b) ∈ CN is the received signal by the legitimate
receiver, and Z(s, b) ∈ CN is the received signal by the eavesdropper. Wm(s, b) and We(s, b) are independent noise
vectors, whose elements are drawn from standard complex normal distribution. We assume that the channel gains of
the main channel Gm(s, b) and the eavesdropper channel Ge(s, b) are i.i.d. complex random variables. The power
gains of the fading channels are denoted by Hm(s, b) = |Gm(s, b)|2 and He(s, b) = |Ge(s, b)|2. We sometimes use
the vector notation H(·) = [Hm(·) He(·)] for simplicity, and also use the notation Hs,b = {H}s,bs′=1,b′=1 to denote
the set of channel gains H(s′, b′) observed until block (s, b). We use similar notation for other signals as well, and
denote the sample realization sequences with lowercase letters. We assume that the probability density function of
instantaneous channel gains, denoted as f(h), is well defined, and is known by all parties. We define channel state
information (CSI) as one’s knowledge of the instantaneous channel gains. We define full transmitter CSI as the
case in which the transmitter has full causal knowledge of the main and eavesdropper channel gains. We define
main transmitter CSI as the case in which that the transmitter only knows the CSI of the legitimate receiver. In
both cases, the eavesdropper has complete knowledge of both the main and the eavesdropper channels. Let P (s, b)
denote the power allocated at block (s, b). We consider a long term power constraint (or average power constraint)
such that,
lim sup
S,B→∞
1
SB
S∑
s=1
B∑
b=1
P (s, b) ≤ Pavg (1)
for some Pavg > 0.
Let {W (s, b)}S,Bs=1,b=1 denote the set of messages to be transmitted with a delay constraint. W (s, b) becomes
available at the transmitter at the beginning of block (s, b), and needs to be securely communicated to the legitimate
receiver at the end of that particular block. We consider the problem of constructing (2NR, N) codes to communicate
message packets W (s, b) ∈ {1, · · · , 2NR} of equal size, which consists of:
1) A stochastic encoder that maps (w(s, b), xs,b−1) to x(s, b) based on the available CSI, where xs,b−1 summarizes
the previously transmitted signals1, and
2) A decoding function that maps ys,b to wˆ(s, b) at the legitimate receiver.
Note that we consider the current block x(s, b) to be a function of the past blocks xs,b−1 as well. This kind of
generality allows us to store shared randomness to be exploited in the future to increase the achievable secrecy rate.
1An exception is for b = 1, in which case the previous signals are summarized by xs−1,B .
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3Define the error event with parameter δ at block (s, b) as
E(s, b, δ) =
{
Wˆ (s, b) 6= W (s, b)
}
∪
{ 1
N
‖X(s, b)‖2 > P (s, b) + δ
}
which occurs either when the decoder makes an error, or when the power expended is greater than P (s, b)+ δ. The
equivocation rate at the eavesdropper is defined as the entropy rate of the message at block (s, b), conditioned on
the received signal by the eavesdropper during the transmission period, and available eavesdropper CSI, which is
equal to 1NH(W (s, b)|Z
SB,hSB). The secrecy outage event at rate R with parameter δ at block (s, b) is defined
as
Osec(s, b, R, δ) = Oeq(s, b, R, δ) ∪ Och(s, b, R) (2)
where the equivocation outage
Oeq(s, b, R, δ) =
{
1
N
H(W (s, b)|ZSB,hSB) < R− δ
}
occurs if the equivocation rate at block (s, b) is less than R − δ, and channel outage
Och(s, b, R) =
{
1
N
I (X(s, b);Y(s, b)) < R
}
occurs if channel at block (s, b) is unsuitable for reliable transmission at rate R. Defining O¯sec(·) as the complement
of the event Osec(·), we now characterize the notion of ǫ-achievable secrecy capacity.
Definition 1: Rate R is achievable securely with at most ǫ probability of secrecy outage if, for any fixed δ > 0,
there exist S,B and N large enough such that the conditions
P(E(s, b, δ)|O¯sec(s, b, R, δ)) < δ (3)
P(Osec(s, b, R, δ)) < ǫ+ δ (4)
are satisfied for all (s, b), s 6= 1.
We call such R an ǫ-achievable secrecy rate. Note that the security constraints are not imposed on the first
super-block.
Definition 2: The ǫ-achievable secrecy capacity is the supremum of ǫ-achievable secrecy rates R.
Remark 1: The notion of secrecy outage was previous defined and used in [6], [8]. However, those works did not
consider the technique of storing shared randomness for future use, and in that case, secrecy outage depends only
on the instantaneous channel states. In our case, secrecy outage depends on previous channel states as well. Note
that we do not impose a secrecy outage constraint on the first superblock (s = 1). We refer to the first superblock
as an initialization phase used to generate initial common randomness between the legitimate nodes. Note that this
phase only needs to appear once in the communication lifetime of that link. In other words, when a session (which
consists of S superblocks) between the associated nodes is over, they would have sufficient number of common
key bits for the subsequent session, and would not need to initiate the initialization step again.
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4III. CAPACITY RESULTS
In this section, we investigate this capacity under two different cases; full CSI and main CSI at the transmitter.
Before giving the capacity results, we define the following quantities. For a given power allocation function P (s, b),
let Rm(s, b) and Rs(s, b) be as follows,
Rm(s, b) = log(1 + P (s, b)Hm(s, b)) (5)
Rs(s, b) =[log(1 + P (s, b)Hm(s, b))− log(1 + P (s, b)He(s, b))]
+ (6)
where [·]+ = max(·, 0). Note that, Rm(·) is the supremum of achievable main channel rates, without the secrecy
constraint. Also, Rs(·) is the non-negative difference between main channel and eavesdropper channel’s supremum
achievable rates. We show in capacity proofs that the outage capacity achieving power allocation functions lie
in the space of stationary power allocation functions that are functions of instantaneous transmitter CSI. Hence
for full CSI, we constrain ourselves to the set P of stationary power allocation policies that are functions of
h(s, b) = [hm(s, b) he(s, b)]. For simplicity, we drop the block index (s, b), and use the notation P (h) for the
stationary power allocation policy. Similarly, with main CSI we consider the power allocation policies that are
functions of hm(s, b), and use the notation P (hm) for the stationary power allocation policy. In both cases, since
the secrecy rate Rs(s, b), and the main channel rate Rm(s, b) are completely determined by the stationary power
allocation functions P (·) and channel gains h, we will interchangeably use the notations Rs(s, b) ≡ Rs(h, P ) and
Rm(s, b) ≡ Rm(h, P ).
A. Full CSI
Theorem 1: Let the transmitter have full CSI. Then, for any ǫ, 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, the ǫ-achievable secrecy capacity is
identical to
CǫF = max
P (h)∈P′
E[Rs(H, P )]
1− ǫ
(7)
where the set P ′ ⊆ P consists of power control policies P (h) that satisfies the following conditions.
P
(
Rm(H, P ) <
E[Rs(H, P )]
1− ǫ
)
≤ ǫ (8)
E[P (H)] ≤ Pavg (9)
A detailed proof of achievability and converse part is provided in Appendix A. Here, we briefly justify the result.
For a given P (h), Rs(h, P ) the supremum of the secret key generation rates within a block that experiences channel
gains h [3]. This implies that the expected achievable secrecy rate [4] is E[Rs(H, P )] without the outage constraint.
With the outage constraint, the fluctuations of Rs(H, P ) due to fading are unacceptable, since Rs(H, P ) can go
below the desired rate when the channel conditions are unfavorable (e.g., when Hm < He, Rs(H, P ) = 0). Hence,
we utilize secret key buffers to smoothen out these fluctuations to provide secrecy rate of E[Rs(H, P )] at each
block. The generated secrecy is stored in secret key buffers of both the transmitter and receiver, and is utilized to
secure data of same size using Vernam’s one-time pad technique. With the allowable amount of secrecy outages, this
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5rate goes up to E[Rs(H, P )]/(1− ǫ). The channel outage constraint (8) on the other hand is a necessary condition
to satisfy the secrecy outage constraint in (4) due to (2).
Example 1: Consider a four state system, where Hm and He takes values from the set {1, 10} and the joint
probabilities are as given in Table I. Let the average power constraint be Pavg = 0.5, and there is no power control,
i.e., P (h) = Pavg ∀h. The achievable instantaneous secrecy rate at each state is given in Table II. According to the
pessimistic result in [6,8], any non-zero rate cannot be achieved with a secrecy outage probability ǫ < 0.6 in this
case. However, according to Theorem 1, rate R = 0.81−ǫ can be achieved with ǫ secrecy outage probability
2
, since
E[Rs(H, Pavg)] = 0.8. A sample path is provided for both schemes in Figure 1, and it is shown how our scheme
avoids secrecy outage in the second block.
TABLE I
P(h)
↓ hm \ he → 1 10
1 0.1 0.1
10 0.4 0.4
TABLE II
Rs(h, PAVG)
↓ hm \ he → 1 10
1 0 0
10 2 0
xorxor rec
data
data data
data
key
queue
1 key
bit
1 bit
encrypted
1 data
bit
Strategy 2
Strategy 1
wiretap
channel
rec
wiretap
channel
rec
no data bits
random bit
generator
queue
keykey
queue
wiretap
channel
random bit
generator
rec
key
queue
Rates
wiretap
channel
Outage
No Outage
1 bit
1 bit 1 data bit 1 bit
1 bit 1 data bit 1 bit
1 bit
PSfrag replacements
block 1, h = [10 1] block 2, h = [10 10]
Rm = 2.58, Rs = 0Rm = 2.58, Rs = 2
Rs = 0
Rs = 0Rs = 2
Rs = 2
Fig. 1. A sample path. With strategy 2, secrecy outage can be avoided for block t = 2 via the use of key bits.
B. Main CSI
Theorem 2: Let the transmitter have main CSI. Then, for any ǫ, 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, the ǫ-achievable secrecy capacity is
identical to
CǫM = max
P (hm)∈P′′
E[Rs(H, P )]
1− ǫ
(10)
2Although Theorem 1 is stated for the case where random vector H is continuous, the result similarly applies to discrete H as well.
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6where the set P ′′ ⊆ P consists of power control policies P (hm) that satisfies the following conditions.
P
(
Rm(H, P ) <
E[Rs(H, P )]
1− ǫ
)
≤ ǫ (11)
E[P (Hm)] ≤ Pavg (12)
Although the problems (7)-(9) and (10)-(12) are of the same form, due to the absence of eavesdropper CSI, the
maximization in this case is over power allocation functions P ′′ that depend on the main channel state only. Hence,
CǫM ≤ C
ǫ
F . A detailed proof of achievability and converse is provided in Appendix B. As in the full CSI case, our
achievable scheme uses similar key buffers and Vernam’s one time pad technique to secure the message. The main
difference is the generation of secret key bits. Due to the lack of knowledge of He(s, b) at the transmitter, secret key
bits cannot be generated within a block. Instead, using the statistical knowledge of He(s, b), we generate keys over
a super-block. Roughly, over a superblock the receiver can reliably obtain NBE[Rm(H, P )] bits of information,
while the eavesdropper can obtain NBE[Rm(H, P ) − Rs(H, P )] bits of information. From privacy amplification
arguments [9], NBE[Rs(H, P )] bits of secret key can be extracted by using a universal hash function.
Now, we show that power allocation policy has minimal impact on the performance in the high power regime.
Theorem 3: For any ǫ > 0, the ǫ-achievable secrecy capacities with full CSI and main CSI converge to the same
value
lim
Pavg→∞
CǫF = lim
Pavg→∞
CǫM =
EHm>He log (Hm/He)
(1− ǫ)
(13)
Proof: For h ≡ [hm he] such that hm > he, we can see from (6) that limP (h)→∞Rs(h, P ) = log
(
hm
he
)
, and
for hm ≤ he, Rs(h, P ) = 0. Furthermore, for hm > 0, we can see from (5) that limP (h)→∞Rm(h, P ) =∞. Let
P (h) = Pavg (no power control), which does not require any CSI. Then, we get
lim
Pavg→∞
E[Rs(H, P )] = EHm>He log (Hm/He) <∞
Combining the last 2 equations, we get
lim
Pavg→∞
P
(
Rm(H, P ) <
E[Rs(H, P )]
1− ǫ
)
= P(Hm = 0)
and P(Hm = 0) = 0, since probability density function of H is well defined. Hence, channel outage constraints
(8) and (11) are not active in the high power regime. Therefore, P (h) ∈ P ′, and P (h) ∈ P ′′. From (7)-(9) and
(10)-(12), we conclude that CF = CM = EHm>He log (Hm/He) /(1− ǫ).
Our simulation results also illustrate that the power allocation policy has minimal impact on the importance in the
high power regime. On the other hand, when the average power is limited, the optimality of the power allocation
function is of critical importance, which is the focus of the following section.
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION STRATEGY
A. Full CSI
The optimal power control strategy, P ∗(h) is the stationary strategy that solves the optimization problem (7)-(9).
In this section, we will show that P ∗(h) is a time-sharing between the channel inversion power policy, and the
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7secure waterfilling policy. We first introduce the channel inversion power policy, Pinv(h, R), which is the minimum
required power to maintain main channel rate of R. For h = [hm he],
Pinv(h, R) =
2R − 1
hm
(14)
Next we introduce Pwf(h, λ),
Pwf(h, λ) =
1
2
[√( 1
he
−
1
hm
)2
+
4
λ
(
1
he
−
1
hm
)
−
(
1
he
+
1
hm
)]+
, (15)
We call it the ’secure waterfilling’ power policy because it maximizes the ergodic secrecy rate without any outage
constraint, and resembles the ’waterfilling’ power control policy. Here, the parameter λ determines the power
expended on average. Now, let us define a time-sharing region
G(λ, k) =
{
h : [Rs(h, Pinv)−Rs(h, Pwf)]
+
− λ [Pinv(h, b)− Pwf(h, λ)]
+
≥ k
}
(16)
which is a function of parameters λ and k.
Theorem 4: P ∗(h) is the unique solution to
P ∗(h) =Pwf(h, λ
∗) + 1 (h ∈ G(λ∗, k∗)) (Pinv(h, C
ǫ
F )− Pwf(h, λ
∗))
+ (17)
subject to: k∗ ≤ 0, λ∗ > 0
CǫF = E[Rs(H, P
∗)]/(1− ǫ) (18)
P(H ∈ G(λ∗, k∗)) = 1− ǫ (19)
E[P ∗(H)] = Pavg (20)
where E[Rs(H, P ∗)] is the expected secrecy rate under the power allocation policy P ∗(h).
Proof: Define a sub-problem
E[Rs(H, P
R)] =max
P (h)
E [Rs(H, P )] (21)
subject to: P (h) ≥ 0, ∀h
E[P (H)] ≤ Pavg, (22)
P (Rm(H, P ) < R) ≤ ǫ (23)
Let PR(h) be the power allocation function that solves this sub-problem. Note that for R = E[Rs(H, PR)]/(1−ǫ),
this problem is identical to (7)-(9), hence giving us P ∗(h). We will prove the existence and uniqueness of such R.
Lemma 1: There exists a unique Rmax > 0 such that the sub-problem (21)-(23) has a solution for all R ≤ Rmax,
which is found by solving
Pavg =
∫
hm≥c
Pinv(h, Rmax)f(h)dh (24)
for h ≡ [hm he], where the constant c is chosen such that P(Hm ≤ c) = ǫ.
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8Proof is provided in Appendix C-A.
Lemma 2: For any R ≤ Rmax,
PR(h) =Pwf(h, λ) + 1 (h ∈ G(λ, k)) (Pinv(h, R)− Pwf(h, λ))
+
where k ∈ (−∞, 0] and λ ∈ (0,+∞) are parameters that satisfy (22) and (23) with equality.
Proof is provided in Appendix D. It is left to show there exists a unique R that satisfies R = E[Rs(H, PR)]/(1−ǫ).
Lemma 3: E[Rs(H, PR)] is a continuous non-increasing function of R.
Proof is provided in Appendix C-B.
Lemma 4: There exists a unique R, 0 ≤ R ≤ Rmax, which satisfies R = E[Rs(H, PR)]/(1− ǫ).
Proof is provided in Appendix C-C. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Due to (17), the optimal power allocation function is a time-sharing between the channel allocation power allocation
function and secure waterfilling; a balance between avoiding channel outages, hence secrecy outages, and maxi-
mizing the expected secrecy rate. The time sharing region G(λ, k) determines the instants h, for which avoiding
channel outages are guaranteed through the choice of P (h) = max(Pinv(h, R), Pwf(h, λ)). (19) ensures that channel
outage probability is at most ǫ, and (20) ensures that average power constraint is met with equality. (18), on the
other hand, is an immediate consequence of (7).
Note that, an extreme case is P ∗(h) = Pwf(h, λ∗) ∀h, which occurs when Pinv(h, R) ≤ Pwf(h, λ∗) for any
h ∈ G(λ∗, k∗), which translates into the fact that the secure waterfilling solution itself satisfies the channel outage
probability in (8). However, that the other extreme (P ∗(h) = Pinv(h, R∗) ∀h) cannot occur for any non-zero ǫ
due to (17). The parameter CǫF can be found graphically as shown in Figure 2, by plotting E[Rs(H, PR)] and and
(1− ǫ)R as a function of R. The abcissa of the unique intersection point is R = CǫF .
0
0
Finding CF
ε
 on Graph
 
 
E[R
s
( H,PR)]
(1−ε)R
CF
ε
E[R
s
( H,PCF
ε
)]
R
max
Fig. 2. Finding Cǫ
F
with graphical approach
Example 2: Consider the same system model in Example 1. We have found that for R = 0.81−ǫ bits/channel use
is achievable with ǫ probability of secrecy outage with no power control, i.e., P (h) = 0.5 ∀h. Let ǫ = 0.2, we
will see if we can do better than R = 1 with power control. Solving the problem (17)-(20), we can see that3 the
3Although Theorem 4 assumes H is a continuous random vector, the results similarly hold for the discrete case as well.
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9time-sharing, and power expended in each state are as given in Tables III and IV. For h ≡ [hm he] = [10 1], i.e.,
the legitimate channel has a better gain, secure waterfilling is used and when h = [10 10], secret key bits cannot
be generated, but channel inversion is used to guarantee a main channel rate of R, which is secured by the excess
keys generated during the state h = [10 1]. As a result, we can see that a rate of C0.2F = 1.26 bits/ per channel use
is achievable, which corresponds to 26% increase with respect to no power control. As mentioned in Theorem 3,
this gain diminishes at the high power regime, i.e., when Pavg →∞.
TABLE III
TIME SHARING REGIONS
↓ hm \ he → 1 10
1 wf wf
10 wf inv
TABLE IV
P ∗(h)
↓ hm \ he → 1 10
1 0 0
10 1.11 0.14
B. Main CSI
Here, we find the optimal power control strategy P ∗(hm), which solves the optimization problem (10)-(12). Let
us define Pw(hm, λ) as the maximum of 0, and the solution of the following equation
∂E[Rs(H, P )]
∂P (hm)
=
hmP(he ≤ hm)
1 + hmP (hm)
−
∫ hm
0
(
he
1 + heP (hm)
)
f(he)dhe − λ = 0 (25)
Pw(hm, λ) will replace Pwf(h, λ) in the full CSI case.
Theorem 5: P ∗(hm) is the unique solution to
P ∗(hm) =Pw(hm, λ
∗) + 1(hm ≥ c) (Pinv(hm, C
ǫ
M )− Pw(hm, λ
∗))
+ (26)
subject to: λ∗ > 0
CǫM = E[Rs(H, P
∗)]/(1 − ǫ) (27)
P(Hm ≥ c) = 1− ǫ (28)
E[P ∗(Hm)] = Pavg (29)
where E[Rs(H, P ∗)] is the expected secrecy rate under the power allocation policy P ∗(hm).
Proof: The proof follows the approach in Full CSI case, hence we omit the details for brevity. Define the
sub-problem
E[Rs(H, P
R)] = max
P (hm)
E [Rs(H, P )] (30)
subject to: P (hm) ≥ 0, ∀hm
E[P (Hm)] ≤ Pavg, (31)
P (Rm(H, P ) < R) ≤ ǫ (32)
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Let PR(hm) be the power allocation function that solves this sub-problem. Lemmas 1 and 4 also hold in this case.
The only difference is the following lemma, which replaces Lemma 2 in Full CSI.
Lemma 5: For any R ≤ Rmax,
PR(hm) = Pw(hm, λ) + 1(hm > c) (Pinv(hm, R)− Pw(hm, λ))
+
where c is a constant that satisfies P(Hm ≥ c) = 1 − ǫ, and λ ∈ (0,+∞) is a constant that satisfies (31) with
equality.
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2, and is provided in Appendix E.
The graphical solution in Figure 2 to find CǫF also generalizes to the main CSI case.
V. SIZING THE KEY BUFFER
The proofs of the capacity results of Section III assume availability of infinite size secret key buffers at the
transmitter and receiver, which mitigate the effect of fluctuations in the achievable secret key bit rate due to fading.
Finite-sized buffers, on the other hand will lead to a higher secrecy outage probability due to wasted key bits by
the key buffer overflows. We revisit the full CSI problem, and we consider this problem at ‘packet’ level, where
we assume a packet is of fixed size of N bits. We will prove the following result.
Theorem 6: Let ǫ′ > ǫ. Let MCǫ
F
(ǫ′) be the buffer size (in terms of packets) sufficient to achieve rate CǫF with
at most ǫ′ probability of secrecy outage. Then,
lim
ǫ′ցǫ
MCǫ
F
(ǫ′)− CǫF
Var[Rs(H,P
Cǫ
F )]+(Cǫ
F
)2ǫ(1−ǫ)
(ǫ′−ǫ)Cǫ
F
log
(
Var[Rs(H,P
Cǫ
F )]+(Cǫ
F
)2ǫ(1−ǫ)
(ǫ′−ǫ)2Cǫ
F
) ≤ 1 (33)
Before providing the proof, we first interpret this result. If buffer size is infinite, we can achieve rate CǫF with ǫ
probability of secrecy outage. With finite buffer, we can achieve the same rate with ǫ′ probability of secrecy outage.
Considering this difference to be the price that we have to pay due to the finiteness of the buffer, we can see that
the buffer size required scales with O
(
1
ǫ′−ǫ log
1
ǫ′−ǫ
)
, as ǫ′ − ǫ→ 0.
Proof: Achievability follows from simple modifications to the capacity achieving scheme described in Ap-
pendix A. We will first study the key queue dynamics, then using the heavy traffic limits, we provide an upper
bound to the key loss ratio due to buffer overflows. Then, we relate key loss ratio to the secrecy outage probability,
and conclude the proof.
For the key queue dynamics, we use a single index t to denote the time index instead of the double index (s, b),
where t = sB+b. We consider transmission at outage secrecy rate of R, and use power allocation function PR(h),
which solves the problem (21)-(23). Let us define {QM(t)}∞t=1 as the key queue process with buffer size M , and
let QM (1) = 0. Then, during each block t,
1) The transmitter and receiver agree on secret key bits of size Rs(t) using privacy amplification, and store the
key on their secret key buffers.
2) The transmitter pulls key bits of size R from its secret key buffer to secure the message stream of size R
using one time pad, and transmits over the channel.
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as explained in Appendix A. The last phase is skipped if outage (Oenc(t)) is declared, which is triggered by one
of the following events
• Channel Outage (Och(t)): The channel cannot support reliable transmission at rate R, i.e. Rm(t) < R.
• Key Outage (Okey(t)): There are not enough key bits in the key queue to secure the message at rate R. This
event occurs when QM (t) +Rs(t)−R < 0.
• Artificial outage (Oa(t)): Outage is artificially declared, even though reliable transmission at rate R is possible.
Due to the definition of PR(h), P(Och(t)) ≤ ǫ ∀t, and the set {Och(t)} of events indexed by t are i.i.d. We choose
{Oa(t)} such that Ox(t) = Och(t) ∪ Oa(t) is i.i.d. as well, and
P(Ox(t)) = ǫ, ∀t
The dynamics of the key queue can therefore be modeled by
QM (t+ 1) = min(M,QM (t) +Rs(t)− 1(O¯enc(t))R) (34)
Note that QM (t) ≥ 0 ∀t, due to the definition of Okey(t).
Let LT (M) be the time average loss ratio over the first T blocks, for buffer size M , which is defined as the
ratio of the amount of loss of key bits due to overflows, and the total amount of input key bits
LT (M) =
∑T
t=1
(
QM (t) +Rs(t)− 1(O¯enc(t))R −M
)+∑T
t=1Rs(t)
(35)
Then, we can see that ∀T > 0,
(1− LT (M))
T∑
t=1
Rs(t) = QM (T ) +
T∑
t=1
R1(O¯enc(t)) (36)
follows from (34), (35), and the fact that QM (1) = 0.
Lemma 6: QM (t) converges in distribution to an almost surely finite random variable.
The proof is provided in Appendix F-A. This implies that limt→∞ P(Oenc(t)) exists. Now, we provide our asymptotic
result for the key loss ratio. We define the drift and variance of this process as
µR = E[Rs(H, P
R)−R1(O¯x(t))]
= E[Rs(H, P
R)]−R(1− ǫ) (37)
and
σ2R = Var[Rs(H, P
R)−R1(O¯x(t))]
respectively, where (37) follows from the definition of Ox(t).
Lemma 7: For any M > 0, the key loss ratio satisfies the following asymptotic relationship
lim
RցCǫF
lim
T→∞
LT
(
M
σ2R
|µR|
)
2|µR|E[Rs(H, P
R)]e
−2R|µR|
σ2
R
σ2R
≤ e−2M (38)
The proof is provided in Appendix F-B.
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Lemma 8: If limt→∞ P(Oenc(t)) = ǫ′, then ǫ′ secrecy outage probability (4) is satisfied.
Proof: Find B such that P(Oenc(t)) = ǫ′ + δ for any t > B. In 2-index time notation (s, b) with t = sB + b,
it corresponds to P(Oenc(s, b, R)) = ǫ′ + δ, ∀(s, b) : s 6= 1. Then.
P(Osec(s, b, R, δ)) ≤ P(Osec(s, b, R, δ)|O¯enc(s, b, R)) + P(Oenc(s, b, R)) (39)
≤ P(Oenc(s, b, R)) (40)
≤ ǫ′ + δ (41)
Here, (39) follows from the union bound, and second term follows from the equivocation analysis (54) and (55) in
Appendix A, which shows that there exists some packet size N large enough such that P(Osec(s, b, R, δ)|O¯enc(s, b, R)) =
0. Equation (41) implies that ǫ′ secrecy outage probability (4) is satisfied.
Let limt→∞ P(Oenc(t)) = ǫ′. Since P(Ox(t)) = ǫ and Oenc(t) = Ox(t)∪Okey(t), we have limt→∞ P(Okey(t)) > 0.
This implies that limT→∞ 1TQM (T ) = 0 (since otherwise, key outage probability would be zero), which, due to
(36) implies
(1− lim
T→∞
LT (M))E[Rs(H, P
R)] = (1− lim
t→∞
P(Oenc(t)))R
= (1− ǫ′)R (42)
Here, due to the choice of power allocation function PR(h), we have E[Rs(H, PR)] = limT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1Rs(t).
Plugging the result of Lemma 7 into (42), we obtain the required key buffer size to achieve ǫ′ probability of secrecy
outage
lim
RցCǫF
MR(ǫ
′)−R
σ2
R
2|µR|
log
(
σ2
R
2|µR|(E[Rs(H,PR)]−(1−ǫ′)R)
) ≤ 1 (43)
We know from (7) that ǫ and ǫ′-achievable secrecy capacities satisfy the conditionsCǫ′F (1−ǫ′) = E[Rs(H, PR)]|R=Cǫ′F
and CǫF (1− ǫ) = E[Rs(H, PR)]|R=CǫF = E[Rs(H, P
∗)], respectively. By Lemma 3, we know that E[Rs(H, PR)]
is a continuous function of R, hence for any given ǫ′ > ǫ, there exists an R such that CǫF < R < Cǫ
′
F , and
E[Rs(h, P
R)] = (1 − ǫ+ǫ
′
2 )R. Furthermore, as ǫ
′ → ǫ, Cǫ
′
F → C
ǫ
F . Let us define a monotonically decreasing
sequence (ǫ′(1), ǫ′(2), · · · ), such that limi→∞ ǫ′(i) = ǫ. For any i ∈ N, find R(i) such that CǫF < R(i) < C
ǫ′(i)
F ,
and E[Rs(h, PR(i))] = (1− ǫ+ǫ
′(i)
2 )R(i), therefore µR(i) = (ǫ − ǫ
′)/(2R(i)). From (43), we get
lim
i→∞
MR(i)(ǫ
′(i))−R(i)
σ2
R(i)
(ǫ′−ǫ)R(i) log
(
σ2
R(i)
R(i)(ǫ′(i)−ǫ)
) ≤ 1
Since as i→∞, R(i)→ CǫF , ǫ′(i)→ ǫ and σ2R(i) → σ2CǫF , where
σ2CǫF = Var[Rs(H, P
CǫF )− CǫF1(O¯x(t))]
≤ Var[Rs(H, P
CǫF )]− CǫF (1− ǫ)ǫ
The last inequality induces the upper bound (33), which concludes the proof.
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VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct simulations to illustrate our main results with two examples. In the first example, we
analyze the relationship between ǫ-achievable secrecy capacity and average power. We assume that both the main
channel and eavesdropper channel are characterized by Rayleigh fading, where the main channel and eavesdropper
channel power gains follow exponential distribution with means 2 and 1, respectively. Since Rayleigh channel is
non-invertible, maintaining a non-zero secrecy rate with zero secrecy outage probability is impossible. In Figure 3,
we plot the ǫ-achievable secrecy capacity as a function of the average power, for ǫ = 0.02 outage probability, for
both full CSI and main CSI cases. It can be clearly observed from the figure that the gap between capacities under
full CSI and main CSI vanishes as average power increases, which support the result of Theorem 3.
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Fig. 3. The ǫ-achievable secrecy capacities as a function of average power, Pavg
In the second example, we study the relationship between the buffer size, key loss ratio and the outage probability.
We assume that both the main and eavesdropper channel gains follow a chi-square distribution of degree 2, but
with means 2 and 1, respectively. We focus on the full CSI case, and consider the scheme described in Section V.
We consider transmission at secrecy rate of R with the use of the power allocation policy PR(h) that solves the
problem (21)-(23). For ǫ = 0.02, and the average power Pavg = 1, we plot the key loss ratio (35), as a function
of buffer size M in Figure 4, for R = CǫF , R = 1.01CǫF and R = 1.02CǫF , where CǫF is the ǫ-achievable secrecy
capacity. It is shown in Lemma 7 of Section V that expect the key loss ratio LT (M) decreases as R increases,
which is observed in Figure 4. Finally, we study the relationship between the secrecy outage probability and the
buffer size for a given rate. In Figure 5, we plot the secrecy outage probabilities, denoted as ǫ′, as a function of
buffer size M for the same encoder parameters. On the same graph, we also plot our asymptotic result given in
Theorem 6, which provides an upper bound on the required buffer size to achieve ǫ′ outage probability for rate CǫF ,
with the assumption that (33) is an equality for any ǫ′. We can see that, this theoretical result serves as an upper
bound on the required buffer size when ǫ′− ǫ, which is the additional secrecy outages due to key buffer overflows,
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is very small. Another important observation from Figures 4 and 5 is that, for a fixed buffer size, although the key
loss ratio decreases as R increases, secrecy outage probability increases. This is due to the fact that key bits are
pulled from the key queue at a faster rate, hence the decrease in the key loss ratio does not compensate for the
increase of the rate that key bits are pulled from the key queue, therefore the required buffer size to achieve same
ǫ′ is higher for larger values of R.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper obtained sharp characterizations of the secrecy outage capacity of block flat fading channels under the
assumption full and main CSI at the transmitter. In the two cases, our achievability scheme relies on opportunistically
exchanging private keys between the legitimate nodes and using them later to secure the delay sensitive information.
We further derive the optimal power control policy in each scenario revealing an interesting structure based by
judicious time sharing between time sharing and the optimal strategy for the ergodic. Finally, we investigate the
effect of key buffer overflow on the secrecy outage probability when the key buffer size is finite.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First, we prove the achievability. Consider a fixed power allocation function P (h) ∈ P ′. Let us fix R <
E[Rs(H, P )]/(1−ǫ). We show that for any δ > 0, there exist some B and N large enough such that the constraints
in (3) and (4) are satisfied, which implies that any R < E[Rs(H, P )]/(1− ǫ) is an ǫ-achievable secrecy rate. The
outage capacity is then found by maximizing E[Rs(H, P )]/(1− ǫ) over the set P ′ of power allocation functions.
Our scheme utilizes secret key buffers at both the transmitter and legitimate receiver. Then,
i) At the end of every block (s, b), using privacy amplification, legitimate nodes (transmitter and receiver) generate
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N(Rs(s, b)− δ) bits of secret key from the transmitted signal in that particular block, and store it in their secret
key buffers. We denote the generated secret key at the transmitter as V (s, b), and at the receiver as Vˆ (s, b).
ii) At every block (s, b), s 6= 1, the transmitter pulls NR bits from its secret key buffer to secure the outage
constrained message of size H(W (s, b)) = NR, using Vernam’s one time pad. The receiver uses the same key
to correctly decode the message. We denote the pulled key at the transmitter as K(s, b), and at the receiver as
Kˆ(s, b). For simplicity in analysis, we assume that keys generated at s− 1’th superblock are used only in the s’th
superblock. This stage is skipped in the first super-block, and when ’encoder’ outage Oenc(s, b, R) occurs, which
is the union of the following events:
• Channel outage (Och(s, b, R)): Channel is not suitable for reliable transmission at rate R, i.e., Rm(s, b) < R.
• Key outage (Okey(s, b, R)): There are not enough key bits in the key queue to secure W (s, b), i.e.,(
B∑
b′=1
H(V (s− 1, b′))−
b∑
b′=1
H(K(s, b′))
)
< 0
• Artificial outage (Oa(s, b, R)): The transmitter declares ’outage’, even though reliable secure transmission of
W (s, b) is possible. This is introduced to bound the probability of key outages, and is explained in the outage
analysis.
Encoding:
Our random coding arguments rely on an ensemble of codebooks generated according to a zero mean Gaussian
distribution with variance P (s, b) 4.
1) When Oenc(s, b, R) does not occur, the message is secured with the secret key bits pulled from the key queue,
using one time pad5
Wsec(s, b) = W (s, b)⊕K(s, b) (44)
Clearly, Wsec(s, b) ∈ Wsec = {1, · · · , 2NR}. Furthermore, let Wx1(s, b) = {1, · · · , 2N(Rm(s,b)−R−δ)}. To transmit
the one time padded message wsec(s, b), the encoder randomly and uniformly chooses wx1(s, b) among Wx1(s, b),
and transmits to codeword x(s, b) indexed by (wsec(s, b), wx1(s, b)) over the channel.
2) When Oenc(s, b, R) occurs, W (s, b) is not transmitted. LetWx2 = {1, · · · , 2N(Rm(s,b)−δ)}. The encoder randomly
and uniformly chooses wx2(s, b) among Wx2, and transmits to codeword x(s, b) indexed by wx2(s, b) over the
channel.
The reason for transmitting wx1(s, b) and wx2(s, b) is to confuse the eavesdropper to the fullest extent in the privacy
amplification process.
Decoding:
1) When Oenc(s, b, R) does not occur, the receiver finds the jointly typical (wˆsec(s, b), wˆx1(s, b),y(s, b)) pair,
where y(s, b) denotes the received signal at block (s, b). Then, using one-time pad, the receiver obtains wˆ(s, b) =
4Note that, it is also possible to use a finite number of codebooks by partitioning the set {h} of channel gains, and using a different Gaussian
codebook for every partition [4].
5We assume that both the message and the key are converted to binary form in this process.
November 4, 2018 DRAFT
16
wˆsec(s, b)⊕ kˆ(s, b).
2) When Oenc(s, b, R) occurs, the receiver finds the jointly typical (wˆx2(s, b),y(s, b)).
Define the error events
E1(s, b) = {(wˆsec(s, b), wˆx1(s, b)) 6= (wsec(s, b), wx1(s, b))}
E2(s, b) = {wˆx2(s, b) 6= wx2(s, b)}
E3(s, b, δ) =
{
1
N
‖X(s, b)‖2 > P (s, b) + δ
}
Independent of whether the event Oenc(s, b, R) occurs or not, the encoding rate is equal to Rm(s, b) − δ, which
is below the supremum of achievable main channel rates. Furthermore, each element of X(s, b) is independently
drawn from Gaussian distribution of mean 0 and variance P (s, b). Therefore, random coding arguments guarantee
us that ∀B > 0, ∃N1 > 0 such that ∀N > N1, P(E1(s, b)) ≤ δ3B , P(E2(s, b)) ≤
δ
3B and P(E3(s, b)) ≤
δ
3 .
Privacy Amplification: At the end of every block (s, b), the transmitter and receiver generate secret key bits, by
applying a universal hash function on the exchanged signals in that particular block. First, we provide the definition
of a universal hash function.
Definition 3: ( [9]) A class G of functions A → B is universal, if for any x1 6= x2 in A, the probability that
g(x1) = g(x2) is at most 1B when g is chosen at random from G according to a uniform distribution.
Lemma 9: For any B > 0, there exists N2(B) > 0 such that, ∀N > N2(B), and for any block (s, b),
• When Oenc(s, b, R) does not occur, the transmitter and receiver can generate secret key bits V (s, b) =
G([Wsec(s, b) Wx1(s, b)]) and Vˆ (s, b) = G([Wˆsec(s, b) Wˆx1(s, b)]) respectively, such that V (s, b) = Vˆ (s, b)
if the error event E1(s, b) does not occur, and
H(V (s, b)) = N(Rs(s, b)− δ) (45)
1
N
I(V (s, b);ZSB,hSB, G) ≤ δ/B (46)
• Similarly, when Oenc(s, b, R) occurs, the transmitter and receiver can generate secret key bits V (s, b) =
G([Wx2(s, b)]) and Vˆ (s, b) = G([Wˆx2(s, b)]) respectively, such that V (s, b) = Vˆ (s, b) if the error event
E2(s, b) does not occur, and (45), (46) are satisfied.
Proof: The proof follows follows the approach of [11], which applies privacy amplification to Gaussian
channels. First, we introduce the information theoretic quantities required for the proof. For random variables
A,B, define
• Renyi entropy of A as logE[PA(a)]
• Min-entropy as A as H∞(A) = mina log
(
1
PA(a)
)
.
• Conditional min-entropy of A given B as H∞(A|B) = infbH∞(A|B = b).
• δ-smooth min-entropy of A as Hδ∞(A) = maxA′:‖PA−PA′‖<δH∞(A
′).
Without loss of generality, we drop the block index (s, b) and R, and focus on the first block (1, 1), and assume
the event Oenc does not occur. Let WX = [Wsec Wx1], with sample realization sequences denoted by wx. Let
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V = G(WX), where G denotes a random universal hash function that maps WX to to an r-bit binary message
V ∈ {0, 1}r. Then, it is clear that if error event E1 does not occur, Vˆ = V since WX = WˆX , for any choice of
G. To show that the security constraints (45)-(46) are satisfied, we cite the privacy amplification theorem, which
is originally defined for discrete channels. For this purpose, we define a quantization function φ, with sensitivity
parameter ∆ = sup
z
|z− φ(z)|. Let Z∆ = φ(Z) denote the quantized version of Z. where z∆ denotes realization
sequences. Then, by Theorem 3 of [9] there exists a universal function G such that 6
H(G(WX)|Z
∆ = z∆, G) ≥ r −
2r−R(WX |Z
∆=z∆)
ln 2
Now, we relate this expression to the Shannon entropy of the message, conditioned on eavesdropper’s actual received
signal. Using the facts H∞(WX) ≤ R(WX) and H∞(WX |Z∆, G) ≤ H∞(WX |Z∆ = z∆, G), it is easy to show
that
H(G(WX)|Z
∆, G) ≥ r −
2r−H∞(WX |Z
∆)
ln 2
Then, due to the asymptotic relationship between continuous random variables and their quantized versions [13],
there exists a quantization function φ such that ∆ is small enough, and
H(G(WX)|G,Z) ≥ H(G(WX)|G,Z
∆)−
δ
2B
≥ r −
2r−H∞(WX |Z
∆)
ln 2
−
δ
2B
(47)
are satisfied. To relate min-entropy to Shannon entropy, we use the result of Theorem 1 of [11]; ∀δ′ > 0, ∃ a block
length N ′ such that ∀N > N ′,
1
N
H(X∆|Z∆) ≤
1
N
Hδ
′
∞(X
∆|Z∆) + δ/B (48)
Now, we proceed as follows,
H∞(WX |Z
∆) = lim
δ′→0
Hδ
′
∞(W |Z
∆)
≥ H(WX)− I(WX ;Z
∆)−Nδ/B (49)
≥ H(WX)− I(X;Z) −Nδ/B (50)
= NRs −Nδ/B (51)
where (49) follows from (48), and the appropriate choice of N ′. (50) follows from the fact that WX → X →
Z → Z∆ forms a Markov chain.(51) follows from the fact that H(WX) = N(Rm − δ), and similarly I(X;Z) ≤
N(Rm−Rs−δ), which is the eavesdropper’s maximum achievable rate. For the choice of H(V ) = r = N(Rs−δ),
6We omit hSB in the following parts of the proof of Lemma 9 for notational simplicity.
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from (47), (51), and the fact that V = G(WX), we get
I(V ;G,Z) = H(G(WX))−H(G(WX)|Z, G)
≤
2−N(B−1)/B
ln 2
+
δ
2B
≤
δ
B
(52)
since there exists some N ′′ such that forall N > N ′′, (52) Hence, for N > N2 = max(N ′, N ′′), the constraints
(45), (46) are satisfied. The proof for the case where Oenc occurs is very similar, and is omitted.
Equivocation Analysis: Secrecy outage probability can be bounded above as
P(Osec(s, b, R, δ)) = P(Oeq(s, b, R, δ) ∪ Och(s, b, R))
≤ P(Oeq(s, b, R, δ) ∪ Oenc(s, b, R))
≤ P(Oeq(s, b, R, δ)|O¯enc(s, b, R)) + P(Oenc(s, b, R)) (53)
where the first equality follows from the definition of secrecy outage (2), and (53) follows from the union bound.
Now, we upper bound the first term. For the choice N,B such that N = max(N1(B), N2(B)), the equivocation
at every block (s, b) in case of no encoder outage can be bounded as
H(W (s, b)|ZSB ,hSB, G, O¯enc(s, b, R))
(a)
= H(W (s, b)|Z(s− 1, :),hSB, G, O¯enc)
−I(W (s, b);Z(s, b)|Z(s − 1, :),hSB, G, O¯enc)
(b)
≥ H(W (s, b))− I
(
W (s, b);Z(s, b),Wsec(s, b)|
Z(s− 1, :),hSB, G, O¯enc)
)
(c)
≥ NR− I(W (s, b);Wsec(s, b)|Z(s− 1, :),h
SB, G, O¯enc))
(d)
≥ NR−H(K(s, b)|Z(s− 1, :),hSB, G, O¯enc))
(e)
≥ NR−
B∑
b=1
H(V (s− 1, b)|Z(s− 1, :),hSB, G, O¯enc))
≥ N(R− δ) (54)
where we use the notation Z(s, :) = {Z(s, i)}Bi=1, and omit the index (s, b, R) from O¯enc(s, b, R). Notice that
W (s, b) = Wsec(s, b)⊕K(s, b), and due to our encoder structure, Wsec(s, b) is transmitted only in (s, b)’th block,
and similarly, K(s, b) is generated in s − 1’th superblock. Then, due to the memoryless property of the channel,
W (s, b) → (Z(s, b),Z(s − 1, :)) → ZSB , hence (a) follows. The first term of (b) follows since Wsec(s, b) is
independent of Z(s − 1, :), and the second term of (b) follows since W (s, b) → Wsec(s, b) → Z(s, b) forms a
Markov chain. (c) follows due to H(W (s, b)) = NR. (d) follows since there is no encoder outage, hence key outage,
and (e) follows since K(s, b) is pulled from the key buffers, which contain the pool of key bits {V (s− 1, b)}Bb=1
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generated during superblock s− 1, and (54) follows from (46). Then,
P(Oeq(s, b, R, δ)|O¯enc(s, b, R)) = P(
1
N
H(W (s, b)|ZSB,hSB, G) < R− δ)
= 0 (55)
Now, we bound the encoder outage probability. By the union bound,
P(Oenc(s, b, R)) ≤ P(Och(s, b, R) ∪ Oa(s, b, R)) + P(Okey(s, b, R))
Since P (h) ∈ P ′, due to the definition in (8), (9), ∀(s, b)
P(Och(s, b, R)) = P(Rm(s, b) < R)
(f)
= P
(
Rm(H, P ) <
E[Rs(H, P )]
1− ǫ
)
≤ ǫ
where in (f), we interchangeably use Rm(s, b) ≡ Rm(h, P ) due to stationarity of P (h). Note that, the events
Och(s, b, R) indexed by (s, b) are i.i.d. Here, we introduce i.i.d. artificial outages Oa(s, b, R) such that
P(Och(s, b, R) ∪ Oa(s, b, R)) = ǫ, ∀(s, b)
This would help us bound the probability of key outage. For (s, b), s 6= 1
P(Okey(s, b, R)) = P
(
B∑
i=1
H(V (s− 1, i))−
b∑
i=1
H(K(s, i)) < 0
)
= P
( B∑
i=1
N(Rs(s− 1, i)− δ)−
b∑
i=1
NR1(O¯ch(s, i, R) ∩ O¯a(s, i, R)) < 0
)
≤ P
(
B∑
i=1
[
Rs(s− 1, i)− δ −R1(O¯ch(s, i, R) ∩ O¯a(s, i, R))
]
< 0
)
(56)
Note that, the expression in (56) represents a random walk with expected drift µ = E[Rs(H, P )]−δ−R(1−ǫ). For
R ≤ E[Rs(H,P )]−δ1−ǫ , µ > 0, hence by the law of large numbers, ∃B1 > 0 such that ∀B > B1, P(Okey(s, b, R)) < δ,
s 6= 1. Therefore, due to union bound and (53), (54), (55), for the choice B = B1, N = max(N1(B1), N2(B1)),
P(Osec(s, b, R, δ)) ≤ ǫ+ δ, which satisfies (4).
Error Analysis: For N,B such that B = B1, N = max(N1(B1), N2(B1)), ∀(s, b), s 6= 1,
P(E(s, b, δ)|O¯enc(s, b, R)) ≤ P(W (s, b) 6= Wˆ (s, b)) + P
(
1
N
‖X(s, b)‖2 > P (s, b) + δ
)
= P(Wsec(s, b)⊕K(s, b) 6= Wˆsec(s, b)⊕ Kˆ(s, b)) + P
(
1
N
‖X(s, b)‖2 > P (s, b) + δ
)
≤ P(Wsec(s, b) 6= Wˆsec(s, b)) + P(K(s, b) 6= Kˆ(s, b)) + P
(
1
N
‖X(s, b)‖2 > P (s, b) + δ
)
where the first term can be bounded as P(Wsec(s, b) 6= Wˆsec(s, b)) ≤ δ3B due to definition of E1(s, b), and the
choice of N . Similarly, the third term can be bounded as P(Wsec(s, b) 6= Wˆsec(s, b)) ≤ δ/3 due to definition of
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E3(s, b), and the choice of N . The second term can be bounded as
P(K(s, b) 6= Kˆ(s, b))
(a)
≤ 1−
B∏
i=1
P(V (s− 1, i) = Vˆ (s− 1, i))
≤
B∑
i=1
P(V (s− 1, i) 6= Vˆ (s− 1, i))
≤
B∑
i=1
(
P(E1(s− 1, i))P(O¯enc(s− 1, i, R))
+P(E2(s− 1, i))P(Oenc(s− 1, i, R))
)
(b)
≤ B
δ
3B
where (a) follows from the fact that keys used in s’th superblock are generated in s − 1’th superblock, and (b)
follows due to the definitions of E1(s, b) and E2(s, b). Therefore, P(E(s, b, δ)|O¯enc(s, b, R)) ≤ δ. Finally,
P(E(s, b, δ)|O¯sec(s, b, R, δ)) = P(O¯enc(s, b, R)|O¯sec(s, b, R, δ))P(E(s, b, δ)|O¯enc(s, b, R))
+ P(Oenc(s, b, R)|O¯sec(s, b, R, δ))P(E(s, b, δ)|Oenc(s, b, R))
≤ P(Oenc(s, b, R)|O¯sec(s, b, R, δ)) + P(E(s, b, δ)|O¯enc(s, b, R))
≤ δ
where the last inequality follows from the fact that P(Oenc(s, b, R)|O¯sec(s, b, R, δ)) = 0. This concludes the
achievability. Now, we prove the converse. Consider a power allocation function P (s, b), which satisfies the average
power constraint
lim sup
S,B→∞
1
SB
S∑
s=1
B∑
b=1
P (s, b) ≤ Pavg (57)
Let δ > 0. It follows from the converse proof of ergodic secrecy capacity [4], and law of large numbers that
∃B1, N1 such that for every S, B > B1, and N > N1, the time-average equivocation rate7 is bounded as
1
SBN
S∑
s=1
B∑
b=1
H(W (s, b)|ZSB ,hSB)
≤ lim sup
S,B→∞
S∑
s=1
B∑
b=1
1
SB
Rs(s, b) + δ (58)
If R is an ǫ achievable rate, then ∃B2, N2 such that ∀B > B2, N > N2
1
SBN
S∑
s=1
B∑
b=1
H(W (s, b)|ZSB ,hSB)
(a)
≥
S∑
s=1
B∑
b=1
1
SB
(R − δ)1(O¯sec(s, b, R, δ))
(b)
≥ (R − δ)(1− ǫ− δ) (59)
7For any reliable code that yields vanishing probability of error as S,B,N → ∞.
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where (a) follows directly from the definition of the event O¯sec(s, b, R, δ) = {H(W (s, b)|ZSB,hSB) ≥ R− δ} ∩{
1
N I(X(s, b);Y(s, b)) ≥ R
}
, and (b) follows from applying the secrecy outage constraint (4), and the law of large
numbers.
From (58), (59), it follows that any ǫ-achievable rate R satisfies
R ≤ R∗ = lim sup
S,B→∞
S∑
s=1
B∑
b=1
1
SB
Rs(s, b)/(1− ǫ) (60)
Since secrecy outage probability has to be satisfied (4), for (s, b), s 6= 1 channel outage probability also has to be
satisfied, i.e., P(Och(s, b, R)) ≤ ǫ, which implies
P(Rm(s, b) < R
∗) ≤ ǫ (61)
Since Rm(s, b) and Rs(s, b) are both deterministic functions of the power P (s, b) and instantaneous channel gains
h(s, b), it follows that the power allocation function that maximizes R∗ under the constraints (57), (61) is a stationary
function of instantaneous channel gains h(s, b). Interchanging the notations P (s, b) ≡ P (h), Rs(s, b) ≡ Rs(h, P )
and Rm(s, b) ≡ Rm(h, P ), we can see that for any ǫ achievable secrecy rate, the constraints (7)-(9) are satisfied,
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof is very similar to the proof for full CSI, hence we only point out the differences. For full CSI, key
generation occurs at the end of every block, using privacy amplification. Due to lack of eavesdropper channel state
at the legitimate nodes, this is no longer possible. However, as shown in [4], it is still possible to generate secret
key bits over a superblock. The following lemma replaces Lemma 9 in the full CSI case.
Lemma 10: Let us define WX(s) = {WX(s, b)}Bb=1, where
WX(s, b) =


[Wsec(s, b) Wx1(s, b)], Oenc(s, b, R) does not occur
[Wx2(s, b)], Oenc(s, b, R) occurs
and similarly define WˆX(s). There exists N2 > 0, B1 > 0 such that, ∀N > N2, B > B1, and for any superblock s,
the transmitter and receiver can generate secret key bits V (s) = G(WX(s)) and Vˆ (s) = G([WˆX(s)) respectively,
such that V (s) = Vˆ (s) if none of the error events {Ei(s, b)}Bb=1, i ∈ {1, 2} occur, and
H(V (s)) = NB(E[Rs(H, P )]− δ) (62)
1
NB
I(V (s);ZSB ,hSB, G) ≤ δ (63)
The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 9, and is omitted here. Following the same equivocation and error
analysis in the full CSI case, we can see that any rate R < E[Rs(H, P )]/(1− ǫ) is achievable. The converse proof
is also the same as in full CSI case, and is omitted here.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS IN SECTION IV-A
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The parameter Rmax is the maximum value for which the problem (21)-(23) has a solution; hence the average
power constraint (22) is active. Moreover, the outage constraint (23) is also active, and due to the fact that Rm(h, P )
is a concave increasing function of P (h), we have P(Rm(H, Rmax) = Rmax) = (1 − ǫ), since otherwise one can
further increase Rmax to find a power allocation function that satisfies the equality. Since for a given h, the power
allocation function that yields Rmax is Pinv(h, Rmax), we have
Pavg =
∫
h∈K
Pinv(h, Rmax)f(h)dh
where K the set of channel gains for which the system operates at rate Rmax, and P(H ∈ K) = (1 − ǫ). The set
K contains channel gains h for which Pinv(h, Rmax) takes minimum values, so that the average power constraint
is satisfied for the maximum possible R. Since Pinv(h, P ) = 2
R−1
hm
is a decreasing function of hm, one can see
that the choice of K that yields Rmax is K = {h : hm ≥ c}. Since the probability density function of H is well
defined, P(Hm = 0) = 0, hence c > 0, which, along with Pavg > 0, implies that Rmax > 0.
B. Proof of Lemma 3
Let Rmax > R > R′ > 0. Then, any P (h) that satisfies P(Rm(H, P ) < R) ≤ ǫ, would also satisfy
P(Rm(H, P ) < R
′) ≤ ǫ. So, the set of power allocation functions that satisfy (23) shrinks as R increases,
hence E[Rs(H, PR)] is a non-increasing function of R. Now, we prove that E[Rs(H, PR)] is continuous. From
Lemma 2, we know that
PR(h) = Pwf(h, λR) + 1(h ∈ G(λR, kR))(Pinv(h, R
′)− Pwf(h, λR))
+
PR
′
(h) = Pwf(h, λR′ ) + 1(h ∈ G(λR′ , kR′))(Pinv(h, R
′)− Pwf(h, λR′ ))
+
where (λR, kR) and (λR′ , kR′) are constants that satisfy (19) and (20) with equality with respect to parameters R
and R′, respectively. Let us define another power allocation function P˜R′(h) such that
P˜R
′
(h) = Pwf(h, λR) + 1(h ∈ G(λR, kR))(Pinv(h, R
′)− Pwf(h, λR))
+
It is easy to see that E[Rs(H, P˜R
′
)] ≤ E[Rs(H, P
R′)]. Combining the facts i) for any h, Pinv(h, R) is a continuous
function of R ii) Rs(h, P ) is a continuous function of P iii) integration preserves continuity, we can see that∫
Rs(h, P
R
inv) − Rs(h, P
R′
inv )1(h ∈ G(λR, kR))f(h)dh is a continuous function of R′. Hence, for any γ > 0, one
can find a δ > 0 such that for any R′ < R, |R′ −R| < δ,
E[Rs(H, P
R)]− E[Rs(H, P
R′)] ≤ E[Rs(H, P
R)]− E[Rs(H, P˜
R′)] (64)
≤
∫
Rs(h, P
R
inv)−Rs(h, P
R′
inv )1(h ∈ G(λR, kR))f(h)dh
≤ γ
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which proves that E[Rs(H, PR)] is a left continuous function of R. Following a similar approach, it can also be
shown that E[Rs(H, PR)] is continuous from the right.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
If E[Rs(H, PR)]|R=0 = 0, then the unique solution of R = E[Rs(H, PR)]/(1 − ǫ) is R = 0. So, consider
E[Rs(H, P
R)]|R=0 = 0. It is easy to see that, E[Rs(H,P
Rmax )]
Rmax
≤ (1 − ǫ), since
E[Rs(H, P
Rmax)] =
∫
hm≥c
Rs(h, P )f(h)dh
≤ Rm(h, P )(1 − ǫ)
= Rmax(1− ǫ)
follows from definition of parameter c, and the inequality Rs(h, P ) ≤ Rm(h, P ). Combining the facts that,
the function E[Rs(H,P
R)]
R is continuous and strictly decreasing on (0, Rmax], limR→0+
E[Rs(H,P
R)]
R = ∞ and
E[Rs(H,P
Rmax )]
Rmax
≤ (1 − ǫ), by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique R > 0, which satisfies
R = E[Rs(H, P
R)]/(1− ǫ).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We use Lagrangian optimization approach to find PR(h). We can express E[Rs(H, PR)] given in (21)-(23) as
max
P (h),G
J(P (H))
s.t Rm(h, P ) ≥ R, ∀h ∈ G
P(H ∈ G) = 1− ǫ (65)
where the Lagrangian J(P (H)) is given by the equation8
J(P (H)) =
∫
Rs(h, P )f(h)dh
− λ
[∫
P (h)f(h)dh− Pavg
]
(66)
Here, G is a set which consists of h for which Rm(h, P ) ≥ R must be satisfied. We will show in this proof that
it is of the form (16). This problem is identical to (21), since their constraint sets are identical. Hence solution of
this problem would also yield PR(h). In the following two-step approach, we proceed to find PR(h). Let us fix
λ > 0.
1) For any G ⊆ [0,∞)× [0,∞), we find PG(h), which is defined as
PG(h) = argmax
P (h)
J(P (H))
s.t Rm(h, P ) ≥ R, ∀h ∈ G (67)
8Note that we leave the constraint (23) as is, and not include it in J(P (H)).
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2) Using the result of part 1, we find PR(h), by finding the set G that maximizes J ′(P (H)), subject to a constraint
P(H ∈ G) = 1− ǫ.
We start with step 1. Since both λ and R are fixed, therefore we drop them from Pinv(·) and Pwf(·), in the following
parts to simplify the notation.
Lemma 11: If the problem (67) has a feasible solution, then it could be expressed as
PG(h) = Pwf(h) + [Pinv(h)− Pwf(h)]
+1(h ∈ G) (68)
where Pwf(h) and Pinv(h) are given in (15) and (14), respectively.
Proof: We will interchangeably use h = [hm he]. Due to (67), Rm(h, P ) = log(1 + P (h)hm) ≥ R, ∀h ∈ G.
Hence, there is a minimum power constraint for set G, as
P (h) ≥ Pinv(h) =
2R − 1
hm
, ∀h ∈ G (69)
Define K as the set in which the minimum power constraint (69) is not active, i.e.,
K = {h ∈ G : P (h) > Pinv(h)} ∪ G¯
where G¯ is complement of G. First, we focus on the solution in the nonboundary set. Since the optimal solution
must satisfy the Euler-Lagrange equations,
dJ(P (h))
dP (h)
= 0,h ∈ K
For h ∈ K, we get the following condition
hm
1 + hmP (h)
−
he
1 + heP (h)
− λ = 0
whose solution yields
P (h) =
1
2


√(
1
he
−
1
hm
)2
+
4
λ
(
1
he
−
1
hm
)
−
(
1
he
+
1
hm
)
If for some h ∈ K, the value P (h) is negative, then due to the concavity of J(P (h)) with respect to P (h), the
optimal value of P (h) is zero [4]. Therefore, the solution yields
P (h) = Pwf(h), ∀h ∈ K (70)
Combining the result with the minimum power constraint inside set G, the solution of (67) yields (68), which
concludes the proof.
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Now, we find PR(h). We proceed by further simplifying the Lagrangian in (66), for the case where P (h) = PG(h),
for a given G as follows.
J(PG(H)) =
∫
h∈G
[Rs(h, P )− λP (h)] f(h)dh
+
∫
h/∈G
[Rs(h, P )− λP (h)] f(h)dh
=
∫
[Rs(h, Pwf)− λPwf(h)] f(h)dh
+
∫
G
{
[Rs(h, Pinv)− Rs(h, Pwf)]
+
− λ [Pinv(h) − Pwf(h)]
+
}
f(h)dh (71)
After this simplification, the first term in (71) does not depend on G. We conclude the proof by showing that
PR(h) = PG∗(h) where the set G∗ is defined as follows,
G∗ =
{
h : [Rs(h, Pinv)−Rs(h, Pwf)]
+ − λ [Pinv(h)− Pwf(h)]
+ ≥ k
}
(72)
where the parameter k is a constant that satisfies P(H ∈ G∗) = (1 − ǫ). We prove this by contradiction. First
define ξ(h) = [Rs(h, Pinv)−Rs(h, Pwf)]+ − λ [Pinv(h) − Pwf(h)]+. Then, it follows from (71) that G∗ is the set
that maximize (71), so
G∗ = argmax
G
∫
G
ξ(h)f(h)dh
Assume that some other G′ 6= G∗ is optimal, where P(H ∈ G′) = 1− ǫ. However, we have
J(PG∗(H))− J(PG′(H))
=
∫
G∗
ξ(h)f(h)dh−
∫
G′
ξ(h)f(h)dh
=
∫
G∗\G′
ξ(h)f(h)dh −
∫
G′\G∗
ξ(h)f(h)dh
≥ 0 (73)
since ∫
G∗\G′
f(h)dh =
∫
G′\G∗
f(h)dh
and
ξ(h)|h∈G∗ ≥ ξ(h)|h∈G′ , ∀h
by definition. This contradicts our assumption that G′ is optimal. Note that, G∗ is identical to (17). This concludes
the proof.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The proof goes along similar lines as in Appendix D, so we skip the details here. We solve the problem for a
fixed λ > 0. First, for any given G ∈ [0,∞), we define the following problem, the solution of which yields PG(hm).
PG(hm) = arg max
P (hm)
J(P (Hm)) (74)
subject to: Rm([hm, he], P ) ≥ R, ∀hm ∈ G (75)
Lemma 12: If the problem (74) has a feasible solution, then it can be expressed as
PG(hm) = Pw(hm, λ) + 1(hm ∈ G) (Pinv(hm, R)− Pw(hm, λ))
+ (76)
Proof: The proof uses the same approach as in proof of Lemma 11. We define the set K such that for any
hm ∈ K, the minimum rate constraint in (75) is not active. Since the optimal solution must satisfy the Euler
Lagrange equations, we have
dJ(P (hm))
dP (hm)
= 0, hm ∈ K
If we solve the equation for any given hm, we get
hmP(He ≤ hm)
1 + hmP (hm)
−
∫ hm
0
(
he
1 + heP (hm)
)
f(he)dhe − λ = 0 (77)
If the power allocation function that solves the equation is negative, then by the convexity of the objective function
[4], the optimal value of P (hm) is 0. Hence, we get Pw(h, λ) as the resulting power allocation function. Whenever
the minimum rate constraint (32) is active, we get the channel inversion power allocation function, Pinv(h, R).
Now, using Lemma 12, we solve the following problem,
max
P (hm),G
J(P (Hm)) (78)
s.t Rm(h, P ) ≥ R, ∀h ∈ G
P(Hm ∈ G) = 1− ǫ
the solution of which yields PR(hm). Lemma 12 proves that the solution is a time-sharing between Pw(hm, λ)
and Pinv(hm, R). Now, we find the optimal G.
Lemma 13: The solution of (78) is of the form (76), with the set G∗ = [c,∞), where c is a constant which
solves P(Hm ≥ c) = 1− ǫ.
Proof: Let PG∗(hm) and PG′(hm) be the power allocation functions that are solutions of (76) given the sets
G∗ and G′, respectively. We show that, any choice of G′ 6= G∗, such that P(Hm ∈ G′) = 1− ǫ is suboptimal, i.e.,
J(PG∗(Hm))− J(PG′(Hm)) ≥ 0
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We continue as follows.
J(PG∗(Hm))− J(PG′ (Hm)) =∫ {∫
hm∈G∗
(
[Rs([hm, he], Pinv)−Rs([hm, he], Pw)]
+
− λ [Pinv(hm, R)− Pwf(hm, λ)]
+
)
f(hm)dhm
}
f(he)dhe
−
∫ {∫
hm∈G′
(
[Rs([hm, he], Pinv)−Rs([hm, he], Pw)]
+ − λ [Pinv(hm, R)− Pwf(hm, λ)]
+
)
f(hm)dhm
}
f(he)dhe
Note that, for any h′m ∈ G∗\G′ and h′′m ∈ G′\G∗, we have h′m > h′′m. Since Pw(h′m, λ) ≥ Pw(h′′m, λ) and
Pinv(h
′
m, λ) < Pinv(h
′′
m, λ), we have
[Pinv(h
′
m, R)− Pw(h
′
m, λ)]
+ ≤ [Pinv(h
′′
m, R)− Pw(h
′′
m, λ)]
+
Since Rs(·, P ) is a concave increasing function of P (·) [4], and for Pw(·, P ), we have dPw(·,P )dP = λ. Therefore
for any he, we have
[Rs([h
′
m, he], Pinv)−Rs([h
′
m, he], Pw)]
+
− λ [Pinv(h
′
m, R)− Pw(h
′
m, λ)]
+
− [Rs([h
′′
m, he], Pinv)−Rs([h
′′
m, he], Pw)]
+
+ λ [Pinv(h
′′
m, R)− Pw(h
′′
m, λ)]
+
≥ 0
Combining this result with the packing arguments following (72) in Appendix D, we get
J(PG∗(Hm))− J(PG′(Hm)) ≥ 0
hence concluding the proof. Note that, this result can also be proved using the arguments of Section 4 in [15].
APPENDIX F
PROOFS IN SECTION V
A. Proof of Lemma 6
Due to Theorem 1.2 of Section VI in [17], it suffices to show that QM (t) is a positive recurrent regenerative
process. Note that QM (t) is a Markov process with an uncountable state space [0 M ], since QM (t) can be
written as QM (t + 1) = min(M,QM (t) + Rs(t) − 1(O¯x(t) ∩ O¯key(t))) where Rs(t) and O¯x(t) are i.i.d., and
O¯key(t) =
{
QM (t) +Rs(t)−R ≥ 0
}
depends only on QM (t) and Rs(t). Therefore, QM (t+1) is independent of
{QM (i)}
t−1
i=1 given QM (t), hence Markovity follows. Now, we prove that QM (t) is a recurrent regenerative process
where regeneration occurs at times t1, t2, · · · such that QM (ti) = M . A sufficient condition for this is to show that
QM (t) has an accessible atom [20].
Definition 4: An accessible atom M is a state that is hit with positive probability starting from any state, i.e.,∑∞
t=1 P(QM (t) =M |QM (1) = i) > 0 ∀i.
Lemma 14: QM (t) has an accessible atom M .
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Proof: Assume QM (1) = i, i ∈ [0,M ]. Note that, Rs(t) and Ox(t) are both i.i.d. Also note that, P
(
Rs(t)−
R1(O¯x(t)) > 0
)
> 0 ∀t 9. Find γ > 0 such that P
(
Rs(t)−R1(O¯x(t)) > γ
)
= γ ∀t. Let ηi = ⌈M−iγ ⌉. Then,
P(QM (ηi + 1) = M |QM (1) = i) ≥
ηi∏
t=1
P
(
Rs(t) + 1(O¯x(t)) > δ
)
≥ γηi
> 0
Since QM (t) is a regenerative process, we know that t2 − t1, t3 − t2, · · · are i.i.d. random variables. Define a
random variable τ , with distribution identical to ti+1 − ti. Now we show that QM (t) is positive recurrent, by
showing E[τ ] <∞. Consider another recursion
Q′M (t+ 1) = min
(
M,Q′M (t) +Rs(t)−R1(O¯x(t))
)+ (79)
with Q′M (1) = QM (1). It is clear that Q′M (t) is also regenerative, where regeneration occurs at {t′i}, where
QM (t
′
i) =M , and let τ ′ be equal in distribution to t′i+1 − t′i.
Lemma 15:
E[τ ] ≤ E[τ ′]
Proof: It suffices to show that when QM (t) 6=M , Q′M (t) ≤ QM (t). By induction, assuming Q′M (t) ≤ QM (t),
we need to verify that Q′M (t+ 1) ≤ QM (t+ 1). Consider QM (t+ 1) < M . Then,
QM (t+ 1) =
(
QM (t) +Rs(t)−R1(O¯x(t) ∩ O¯key(t)
)+
≥
(
QM (t) +Rs(t)−R1(O¯x(t))
)+
≥
(
Q′M (t) +Rs(t)−R1(O¯x(t))
)+
= Q′M (t+ 1)
Note that Q′M (t) is regenerative both at states 0 and M . Let E[τ ′1] denote the expected time for the process Q′M (t)
to hit 0 from M , and E[τ ′2] denote the expected time to hit M from 0. Then,
E[τ ′] ≤ E[τ ′1] + E[τ
′
2] (80)
Since the key queue has a negative drift, i.e., µR = E[Rs(H, P )−R1(O¯x(t))] < 0, it is clear that E[τ ′1] <∞. Now,
we show that E[τ ′2] <∞. Following the approach of Lemma 14, find γ > 0 such that P
(
Rs(t)−R1(O¯x(t)) > γ
)
= γ
9Since considering otherwise would lead to the uninteresting scenario where there are no buffer overflows (since the key queue cannot grow),
hence any buffer size M > Cǫ′
F
is sufficient to achieve ǫ′ secrecy outage probability.
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∀t. Let η = ⌈M/γ⌉. Then, P(QM (η + 1) =M |QM (1) = 0) ≥ γη > 0, and
E[τ ′2] ≤
∞∑
i=0
(η + i(E[τ ′1] + η))γ
η(1− γη)i
≤ ηγη
∞∑
i=0
(1− γη)i +
∞∑
i=0
(1− γη)ii(E[τ ′1] + γ
η)
<∞
The first inequality follows from the fact that with probability γη, QM (t) hits M at η’th block and with probability
(1 − γη), key queue goes back to state 0 at (E[τ ′1] + γη)’th block (on average). The last inequality follows from
0 < γη < 1, and ratio test. This result, along with (80) and Lemma 15 concludes that QM (t) is a positive recurrent
regenerative process, which concludes the proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 7
We follow an indirect approach to prove the lemma. Let {Q(t)}∞t=1 denote the key queue dynamics of the same
system for the infinite buffer case (M =∞). First, we use the heavy traffic results in [18] to calculate the overflow
probability of the infinite buffer queue. Then, we relate the overflow probability of infinite buffer system to the loss
ratio of the finite buffer queue. The dynamics of the infinite buffer queue is characterized by
Q(t+ 1) = Q(t) +Rs(t)− 1(O¯enc(t))R (81)
where Q(1) = 0. The heavy traffic results we will use are for queues that have a stationary distribution. Since it
is not clear whether Q(t) is stationary or not, we will upper bound Q(t) by another stationary process Q′(t), and
the buffer overflow probability result we will get for Q′(t) will serve as an upper bound for Q(t).
Let {Q′(t)}t≥1 be the process that satisfies the following recursion
Q′(t+ 1) =
(
Q′(t) +Rs(t)−R1(O¯x(t)
)+ (82)
with Q′(1) = 0. First, we relate Q′(t) to Q(t).
Lemma 16:
Q(t) ≤ Q′(t) +R, ∀t (83)
Proof: Assuming Q(t) ≤ Q′(t) +R, we need to show by induction that Q(t+ 1) ≤ Q′(t+1)+R. There are
two different scenarios.
1) If Q′(t) + Rs(t) − R1
(
O¯x(t)
)
≥ 0, then, using the facts O¯enc(t) = O¯x(t) ∩ O¯key(t) and Q′(t) ≤ Q(t), we
obtain
Q(t) +Rs(t)−R1
(
O¯enc(t)
)
≥ Q′(t) +Rs(t)−R1
(
O¯x(t)
)
≥ 0
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which, using the described key queue recursions in (81), implies
Q(t+ 1) = Q(t) +Rs(t)−R1
(
O¯x(t)
) (84)
Observe that, by (82),
Q′(t+ 1) = Q′(t) +Rs(t)−R1
(
O¯x(t)
)
which, in conjunction with (84) and Q(t) ≤ Q′(t) +R, yields Q(t+ 1) ≤ Q′(t+ 1) +R.
2) If Q′(t)+Rs(t)−R1
(
O¯x(t)
)
< 0, then Q′(t+1) = 0. We further consider two cases. First, if Q(t)+Rs(t)−
R ≥ 0, then,
Q(t+ 1) =
(
Q(t) +Rs(t)−R1
(
O¯x(t)
) )+
≤
(
Q′(t) +R+Rs(t)−R1
(
O¯x(t)
) )+
≤ R
= Q′(t+ 1) +R (85)
Next, if Q(t) +Rs(t)−R < 0, then
Q(t+ 1) = Q(t) +Rs(t) < R = Q
′(t+ 1) +R
which, combined with (85), yields
Q(t+ 1) ≤ Q′(t+ 1) +R
Now, we show that Q′(t) converges in distribution to an almost surely finite random variable Q′. First, we need to
show that the expected drift of Q′(t) is negative. It is clear from (82) that the expected drift of the process Q′(t)
is equal to µR = E[Rs(H, PR)]−R(1− ǫ).
Lemma 17: For R > CǫF , we have µR < 0, and µR is a continuous decreasing function of R.
Proof: From Lemma 3 in Section IV-A, we know that E[Rs(H, PR)] is a non-increasing continuous function
of R. Therefore, µR it is a continuous function of R. Furthermore, by definition of CǫF in (7), µCǫF = 0. Combining
these two facts, we conclude that µR < 0, for R > CǫF .
Lemma 18: There exists an almost surely finite random variable Q′ such that, for all x,
lim sup
t→∞
P(Q(t) > x) ≤ P(Q′ +R > x) (86)
Proof: Combining Lemma 17 with the classic results by Loynes [16], we can see that Q′(t) converges in
distribution to an almost surely finite random variable Q′ such that
lim
t→∞
P(Q′(t) > x) = P(Q′ > x)
Using (83), we finish the proof of the lemma.
Now, we characterize the tail distribution of the key queue.
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Lemma 19: For any given M ≥ 0,
lim
RցCǫ
F
lim sup
t→∞
P
(
|µR|(Q(t)−R)
σ2R
> M
)
≤ e−2M (87)
Proof: First, we prove that
lim
RցCǫ
F
P
(
|µR|Q
′
σ2R
> y
)
= e−2y, (88)
which is based on the heavy traffic limit for queues developed in [18], see also Theorem 7.1 in [17]. In order to
prove (88), we only need to verify the following three conditions: i) limRցCǫ
F
µR = 0; ii) limRցCǫ
F
σ2R > 0; and
iii) the set
{(
Rs(H, P
R)−R1(O¯x(t))
)2}
of random variables indexed by R is uniformly integrable.
i) From Lemma 17, we obtain limRցCǫ
F
µR = 0.
ii) Since Rs(H, P ∗)− CǫF O¯x(t) is not a constant random variable, almost surely
lim
RցCǫ
F
σ2R = Var[Rs(H, P
∗)− CǫF (O¯x(t))] > 0
iii) Note that, R lies on the interval [0 Rmax], where Rmax, defined in Lemma 1 then we have
(
Rs(H, P
R)−R1(O¯x(t))
)2
=Rs(H, P
R)2 − 2Rs(H, P
R)R1
(
O¯x(t)
)
+
R21
(
O¯x(t)
)
≤Rs(H, P
R)2 +R2max
Since Rs(h, P ) is a continuous function of P (h), and for any R on the interval [0 Rmax], limc→∞ P(PR(H) >
c) = 0, hence we can see that limc→∞ P(Rs(H, PR) > c) = 0. Therefore, this class of random variables is
uniformly integrable. This completes the proof of (88). This result, in conjunction with Lemma 18 completes the
proof.
Using Lemma 1 in [19], we relate the loss ratio of our finite buffer queue QM (t) to the overflow probability of
the infinite buffer queue Q(t) as follows
E[Rs(H, P
R)] lim sup
T→∞
LT (M) ≤
∫ ∞
x=M
lim sup
t→∞
P(Q(t) > x)dx (89)
Combining Lemma 19 with (89), the proof is complete.
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